Vaisheshika, or Vaiśeṣika, (Sanskrit:वैशॆषिक) is one of
the six Hindu schools of philosophy (orthodox Vedic
systems) of India. Historically, it has been closely
associated with the Hindu school of logic, Nyaya.
Vaisesika espouses a form of atomism and postulates that
all objects in the physical universe are reducible to a
finite number of atoms. Originally proposed by the sage
Kaṇāda (or Kana-bhuk, literally, atom-eater) around the
2nd century BC.
Overview
Although the Vaishesika system developed independently
from the Nyaya, the two eventually merged because of
their closely related metaphysical theories. In its
classical form, however, the Vaishesika school differed
from the Nyaya in one crucial respect: where Nyaya
accepted four sources of valid knowledge, the Vaishesika
accepted only perception and inference. Although not
among Kanada's original philosophies[2], later
Vaishesika atomism also differs from the atomic theory
of modern science by claiming the functioning of
atoms(or their characterization because of which they
function in their way) was guided or directed by the
will of the Supreme Being. This is therefore a theistic
form of atomism.
An alternative view would qualify the above in that the
holism evident in the ancient texts mandate the
identification of six separate traditional environments
of philosophy, consisting of three sets of two pairs.
Literature of Vaisheshika
The earliest systematic exposition of the Vaisheshika is
found in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda (or Kaṇabhaksha).
This treatise is divided into ten books. The two
commentaries on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, Rāvaṇabhāṣya and
Bhāradvājavṛtti are no more extant. Praśastapāda’s
Padārthadharmasaṁgraha (c. 4th century) is the next
important work of this school. Though commonly known as
bhāṣya of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, this treatise is basically an
independent work on the subject. The next Vaisheshika
treatise, Candra’s Daśapadārthaśāstra (648) based on
Praśastapāda’s treatise is available only in Chinese
translation. The earliest commentary available on
Praśastapāda’s treatise is Vyomaśiva’s Vyomavatī (8th
century). The other three commentaries are Śridhara’s
Nyāyakandalī (991), Udayana’s Kiranāvali (10th century)
and Śrivatsa’s Līlāvatī (11th century). Śivāditya’s
Saptapadārthī which also belongs to the same period,
presents the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika principles as a
part of one whole. Śaṁkarā Miśra’s Upaskāra on Vaiśeṣika
Sūtra is also an important work[3].
The categories or padartha
According to the Vaisheshika school, all things which
exist, which can be cognised, and which can be named are
padārthas (literal meaning: the meaning of a word), the
objects of experience. All objects of experience can be
classified into six categories, dravya (substance), guṇa
(quality), karma (activity), sāmānya (generality),
viśeṣa (particularity) and samavāya (inherence). Later
Vaiśeṣikas (Śrīdhara and Udayana and Śivāditya) added
one more category abhāva (non-existence). The first
three categories are defined as artha (which can
perceived) and they have real objective existence. The
last three categories are defined as budhyapekṣam
(product of intellectual discrimination) and they are
logical categories.
1.Dravya (substance): The substances are
conceived as 9 in number. They are, pṛthvī (earth), ap
(water), tejas (fire), vāyu (air), ākaśa (sky), kāla
(time), dik (space), ātman (self) and manas (mind). The
first five are called bhūtas, the substances having some
specific qualities so that they could be perceived by
one or the other external senses.
2.Guṇa (quality): The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra mentions 17
guṇas (qualities), to which Praśastapāda added another
7. While a substance is capable of existing
independently by itself, a guṇa(quality) cannot exist
so. The original 17 guṇas (qualities) are, rūpa
(colour), rasa (taste), gandha (smell), sparśa (touch),
saṁkhyā (number), parimāṇa (size/dimension/quantity),
pṛthaktva (inidividuality), saṁyoga
(conjunction/accompaniments), vibhāga (disjunction),
paratva (priority), aparatva (posteriority), buddhi
(knowledge), sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain), icchā
(desire), dveṣa (aversion) and prayatna (effort). To
these Praśastapāda added gurutva (heaviness), dravatva
(fluidity), sneha (viscosity), dharma (merit), adharma
(demerit), śabda (sound) and saṁkāsra (faculty).
3.Karma (activity): The karmas (activities) like
guṇas (qualities) have no separate existence, they
belong to the substances. But while a quality is a
permanent feature of a substance, an activity is a
transient one. Ākaśa (sky), kāla (time), dik (space) and
ātman (self), though substances, are devoid of karma
(activity).
4.Sāmānya (generality): Since there are plurality
of substances, there will be relations among them. When
a property is found common to many substances, it is
called sāmānya.
5.Viśeṣa (particularity): By means of viśeṣa , we
are able to perceive substances as different from one
another. As the ultimate atoms are innumerable so are
the viśeṣas.
6.Samavāya (inherence): Kaṇāda defined samavāya
as the relation between the cause and the effect.
Praśastapāda defined it as the relationship existing
between the substances that are inseparable, standing to
one another in the relation of the container and the
contained. The relation of samavāya is not perceivable
but only inferable from the inseparable connection of
the substances.
Epistemology and syllogism
The early vaiśeṣika epistemology considered only
pratyaksha (perception) and anumāna (inference) as the
pramaṇas (means of valid knowledge). The other two means
of valid knowledge accepted by the Nyaya school, upamāna
(comparison) and śabda (verbal testimony) were
considered as included in anumāna. The syllogism of the
vaiśeṣika school was similar to that of the Nyaya, but
the names given by Praśastapāda to the 5 members of
syllogism are different.
The atomic theory
The early vaiśeṣika texts presented the following
syllogism to prove that all objects i.e. the four bhūtas,
pṛthvī (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and vāyu (air)
are made of indivisible paramāṇus (atoms): Assume that
the matter is not made of indivisible atoms, and that it
is continuous. Take a stone. One can divide this up into
infinitely many pieces (since matter is continuous).
Now, the Himalayan mountain range also has infinitely
many pieces, so one may build another Himalayan mountain
range with the infinite number of pieces that one has.
One begins with a stone and ends up with the Himalayas,
which is obviously ridiculous - so the original
assumption that matter is continuous must be wrong, and
so all objects must be made up of a finite number of
paramāṇus (atoms).
According to the vaiśeṣika school, the trasareṇu (dust
particles visible in the sunbeam coming through a small
window hole) are the smallest mahat (perceivable)
particles and defined as tryaṇukas (triads). These are
made of three parts, each of which are defined as
dvyaṇuka (dyad). The dvyaṇukas are conceived as made of
two parts, each of which are defined as paramāṇu (atom).
The paramāṇus (atoms) are indivisible and eternal, they
can neither be created nor destroyed. Each paramāṇu
(atom) possesses its own distinct viśeṣa
(individuality).
Later developments
Over the centuries, the school merged with the Nyaya
school of Indian philosophy to form the combined school
of nyāya-vaiśeṣika. The school suffered a natural
decline in India after the 15th century.
|